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THE PARCHED EARTH OF COOPERATION: HOW
TO SOLVE THE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS IN
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
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ABSTRACT
This article proposes a way to strengthen international environmental
agreements, such as the Paris Agreement and the Kyoto Protocol.
Multilateral environmental agreements such as these are extremely fragile.
At the heart of the problem is what is known as the tragedy of the commons—
a unique dynamic that viciously sabotages cooperation. The cause of this
tragedy is that no one can trust that other actors will conserve the common
resource, which triggers a race to the bottom—a race to deplete. Global
warming and our inability to halt it is perhaps the ultimate example of a
tragedy of the commons on a truly massive scale. On a domestic level, the
tragedy of the commons is easily solved through regulation. However, on a
supranational level, where there is no overarching authority, governance
mechanisms tend to collapse. The hard truth is that without robust
enforcement of some kind, international cooperation is extremely difficult to
maintain. This article proposes the following idea: governments joining (or
already party to) an agreement, contribute an upfront deposit to an
international regulatory body (the Commons Management Fund (“CMF”))
with the understanding that their contribution will be forfeited if they fail to
honor their treaty commitments. The idea, while ostensibly simple, is
deceptively complex. The focus is not the penalty, but rather the ability of
governments to credibly signal commitment. In game theory, credible
signaling can prevent a tragedy of the commons by generating confidence
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that everyone will stick to their commitments. The CMF is designed to exploit
this effect. Now, more than ever, a solution to the tragedy of the commons
on a supranational level is desperately needed—the CMF is such a solution.
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I. INTRODUCTION
International environmental governance remains shockingly anemic.
While there is now global consensus regarding the magnitude of the threat
posed by the ecological crisis before us, our ability to take meaningful action
to halt or at least slow its advance is profoundly constrained. The problem is
that the basic architecture of the international system is anarchic: “[n]one is
entitled to command; none is required to obey.”1 The international
community lacks a central authority capable of enforcing cooperation. In the
absence of such enforcement, uncertainty between states as to the strength
1. KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 88 (1979).
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of each other’s commitment reliably undermines attempts at collective
action. The hard truth is that without enforcement of some kind, robust
international cooperation will remain elusive.
Consider the recent Paris Agreement on climate change. The agreement
was a remarkable achievement in international diplomacy. Nearly every state
in the world—from North Korea to the United States—pledged to reduce
their greenhouse gas emissions.2 Yet governments face no consequences if
they fall short of their commitments under the agreement. The agreement
thus stands enfeebled upon the shaky edifice of verbal commitments and
good will. Consensus of this kind is extremely fragile. Even a trickle of states
exiting the agreement will, in all likelihood, trigger the withdrawal of more
governments and bring about the total collapse of the agreement. Multilateral
environmental agreements are uniquely susceptible to this pattern of failure.3
This is because for an environmental treaty to work effectively, everyone
needs to be onboard and everyone needs to stay onboard.
The inability to manage a common resource in the absence of an
overarching authority is by no means a new or unrecognized problem—it has
been understood for centuries.4 The inability to effectively coordinate the use
of an open-access resource and the disastrous consequences that may flow
from failing to do so is known as the tragedy of the commons.5 A tragedy of
the commons exists where a group of actors behaving rationally and in-line
with their self-interests depletes a common resource, undermining the entire
group’s long-term interests (along with their own), yet the prevailing
equilibrium forces precisely this outcome. The cause of this tragedy is that
no one can trust that their partners will not overexploit the resource, which
invariably triggers a destructive race to the bottom. The true ‘tragedy’ in the
tragedy of the commons is that actors otherwise willing to husband a
resource are forced by rational self-interest to ‘grab what they can.’ Global
warming and our inability to halt it is perhaps the ultimate example of a
2. Joby Warrick & Chris Mooney, 196 Countries Approve Historic Climate Agreement, WASH.
POST (Dec. 12, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2015/12/12/prop
osed-historic-climate-pact-nears-final-vote/ [https://perma.cc/Y2GA-KREG].
3. Bilateral environmental agreements (where the agreement is between two nation states) are also
vulnerable to this model of collapse. However, because the dynamic involves only two players, the pattern
plays out in a less obvious sequential fashion and may be easier to forestall.
4. See Amy Sinden, The Tragedy of the Commons and the Myth of a Private Property Solution,
78 U. COLO. L. REV. 533, 534–35 (2007).
5. The concept was first formulated in a rigorous way by Garrett Hardin. See Garret Hardin, The
Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1248 (1968). Other terminology used to describe this social
dilemma or aspects thereof include: resource dilemma, take-some dilemma, and common-pool resource.
For a good overview of these descriptors and some of the structural conditions that make up the dilemma,
see MARGARET FODDY, ET AL., RESOLVING SOCIAL DILEMMAS: DYNAMIC, STRUCTURAL, AND
INTERGROUP ASPECTS 9 (2013).
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tragedy of the commons on a truly massive scale. On a domestic level, the
tragedy of the commons is easily solved through regulation. On a
supranational level, however, preventing a tragedy of the commons is
extremely tricky. Because there is no authority able to coordinate the
behavior of the relevant stakeholders, governance mechanisms tend to
collapse.
According to neoclassical welfare economics, there are two solutions to
the tragedy of the commons. The first is top-down regulation, and the second
is privatization of the resource.6 However, both solutions falter on the
international level. The fragmented structure of the international community
precludes solving the tragedy of the commons using regulation as it is
deployed in the domestic realm. The second solution, privatization, is a
radical concept fraught with serious logistical and normative challenges.
This article proposes the following idea: governments joining (or already
party to) an agreement contribute an upfront deposit to an international
regulatory body (the Commons Management Fund (“CMF”)) with the
understanding that their contribution will be forfeited if they fail to honor
their treaty commitments. The idea, while ostensibly simple, is in fact
deceptively complex. The focus is not the penalty, but rather the ability of
governments to credibly signal commitment. In game theory, credible
signaling between actors can prevent a tragedy of the commons from
forming by generating confidence that everyone will stick to their
commitments. There is a sizeable literature on signaling in both economics
and political science, as well as other disciplines.7 The proposal is designed
to exploit this effect. The model is particularly well-suited for treaties
exhibiting a tragedy-of-the-commons dynamic because the problem in such
cases is primarily one of perception, and this model targets perceptions more
effectively than alternative compliance mechanisms.

6. Hardin proposes “mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon” i.e. state regulation. Hardin, supra
note 5, at 1247. Alternatively, Hardin suggests that the commons may be sold off as private property. Id.
at 1245. Note, however, that Hardin also postulates that common ownership pools may also solve the
dilemma. See id. at 1245–46; see also ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION
OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 37–46 (James E. Alt & Douglass C. North eds., 1990)
(arguing that common-pool problems may be solved by voluntary organizations rather than by a coercive
state or privatization); Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1388–91 (1993)
(observing that close-knit social groups often develop strategies that can prevent the tragedy of the
commons). Unfortunately, the international community is the very antithesis of a close-knit social group.
7. For example, costly signaling has been proposed in the IR literature as a method for solving the
security dilemma, the situation in which states, seeking only to strengthen their own military security,
escalate tensions and increase the likelihood of conflict, although neither side desire it. See generally
Evan Braden Montgomery, Breaking out of the Security Dilemma, 31 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 151
(2006). Costly signaling theory is also found in evolutionary biology. See infra note 98 and accompanying
text.
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The discussion that follows focuses primarily on the resource of water.
The global, unconfined nature of water makes it an ideal case study through
which to examine commons management on a supranational level. The
reader should note, however, that the model may be applied to any commonpool resource. The proposal can, in principle, solve the tragedy of the
commons across the board. With the continuing destruction of the global
commons,8 the international community desperately needs a mechanism to
strengthen international environmental governance. If the tragedy of the
commons cannot be brought to heel, the collective prosperity and perhaps
even the very survival of our species is threatened. Yet given the current
political and legal fragmentation of the world, the task of sustaining
coordinated action on such a massive scale is formidable. This difficulty,
however, does not impugn its possibility; it merely speaks to the inadequacy
of our current governance structures. The supranational nature of the global
commons requires a new way to maintain the agreements we make. It is the
aim of this article to lay out the broad strokes of such an approach.
My argument unfolds in three parts. Part II explains the tragedy of the
commons and analyzes it in terms of the prisoner’s dilemma. Part III
examines the standard solutions to the tragedy of the commons—top-down
regulation and privatization—and explains how both approaches fail on the
supranational level. I then propose a solution to the tragedy of the commons
on the international level—the Commons Management Fund. Part IV
explains the theoretical underpinnings of the proposal, how the approach
differs from standard compliance mechanisms employed in treaties, and
how, given the peculiar dynamics of multilateral environmental agreements,
the model is uniquely crafted to diffuse a tragedy of the commons. Part V
concludes.
II. THE PROBLEM UNPACKED: THE TRAGEDY IN THE TRAGEDY
OF THE COMMONS
A. Hardin’s Hungry Cattle
In a tragedy of the commons, agents’ inability to reliably coordinate
gives rise to a social dilemma with grossly inefficient outcomes.9 The
8. The term ‘global commons’ traditionally describes international and supranational resource
domains, such as Antarctica, the world’s oceans and seabed, the atmosphere and space. See, e.g., SUSAN
J. BUCK, THE GLOBAL COMMONS: AN INTRODUCTION 1 (2012). I use the term here and throughout the
discussion, however, more loosely to refer to any common-pool resource that necessitates the collective
action of two or more states.
9. The definition of a social dilemma is any situation in which “the reward or payoff to each
individual for a selfish choice is higher than that for a cooperative one, regardless of what other people
do; yet all individuals in the group receive a lower payoff if all defect than if all cooperate.” FODDY, ET
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tragedy of the commons, also referred to as the common-pool resource
problem,10 is particularly pernicious in situations in which there is no
centralized enforcement, and thus the stakeholders’ ability to diffuse the
dilemma is severely impoverished. Even where it is in the collective interests
of all parties to coordinate, each party, driven by rational self-interest, will
generate a behavioral equilibrium that is, tragically, far worse for all the
stakeholders. Economic rationality thus produces a sub-optimal use of the
resource, often leading to complete destruction of a shared resource.
Examples abound. The canonical example, however, is a group of farmers
overgrazing a common range until it can no longer be grazed (this is the
example used by Garrett Hardin in his famous essay formally describing the
dilemma).11 Each farmer strives to maximize her personal gain by continuing
to add additional cattle onto the grazing land. This gives rise to an externality
problem. While each farmer gleans the full benefit of using the grazing land,
each bears only a portion of the cost of its overuse. Collectively, however,
the farmers bear the complete cost of the overgrazing. Private decisionmakers do not fully internalize the social benefits or costs that flow from
their actions.12 Under these conditions, each farmer will, driven by economic
rationality, continue to introduce additional cattle until the resource—the
grazing land—is completely decimated.13 The expectation that other agents
will behave in the same manner triggers a rush to exploit the resource. In a
tragedy of the commons situation, nothing incentivizes collective action to
avoid resource depletion. Instead, actors have every incentive to deplete the
resource. The tragic irony is that, even where all stakeholders wish to
cooperate because of the threat of free riding, the entire system is nonetheless
driven to eventual collapse. Each actor is compelled by rational self-interest
AL.,

supra note 5, at 1–2.
10. I use the terms common-pool resource problem and the tragedy of the commons
interchangeably going forward.
11. See Hardin, supra note 5, at 1244–45. Hardin, however, was not the first to recognize the
problem; see generally H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common Property Resource: The
Fishery, 62 J. POL. ECON. 124 (1954); Anthony Scott, The Fishery: The Objectives of Sole Ownership,
63 J. POL. ECON. 116 (1955). There are even earlier references to the social dilemma. See Jens Warming,
Om ‘Grundrente’ af Fiskegrunde, NATIONALOKONOMISK TIDSSKRIFT 495 (1911), reprinted and
translated in Peder Andersen, ‘On Rent of Fishing Grounds’: A Translation of Jens Warming’s 1911
Article, with an Introduction, 15 HIST. POL. ECON. 391, 392–96 (1983) (discussing the problem in relation
to open-access fisheries). Indeed, the problem can be found in the work of Aristotle. See ARISTOTLE,
POLITICS 32–33 (n.d.), reprinted in ARISTOTLE, THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1148 (Richard
McKeon ed. & Benjamin Jowett trans., 1941) (“[T]hat which is common to the greatest number has the
least care bestowed upon it.”).
12. See generally R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960); Carl J.
Dahlman, The Problem of Externality, 22 J.L. & ECON. 141 (1979).
13. As Hardin points out, “[f]reedom in a commons brings ruin to all.” Hardin, supra note 5, at
1244.
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to deplete the resource to every actor’s disadvantage. The dilemma can be
summed up concisely, if colloquially: a “get it while you can” mindset
prevails, producing devastating consequences.
The problem extends from the constituent nature of the good in
question: the grazing land is rivalrous and non-excludable. That is, its use by
one consumer prevents consumption by other consumers, and it is not
possible to prevent people from consuming the resource. In his original
analysis, however, Hardin failed to distinguish between common ownership
regimes (where group members jointly hold property rights in the resource)
and open access regimes (where no one holds property rights).14 While the
tragedy of the commons is notorious with respect to open access regimes,
the problem can surface in relation to any “natural or man-made resource
system that is sufficiently large to make it costly (but not impossible) to
exclude potential beneficiaries from obtaining benefits from its use.”15 While
a wide variety of things may be understood as the “commons,” the model is
particularly consequential with respect to environmental issues of
sustainability, such as clean air, forest management, non-renewable energy
sources such as oil and coal, grazing lands, desertification, and—pertinent to
the present discussion—water resources.
B. Lake Tanganyika and the Prisoner’s Dilemma
Common resources that exist on a supranational level are particularly
vulnerable to the tragedy of the commons. This is often the case with water
reserves. Water has little respect for political boundaries or legal
jurisdictions. Indeed, large bodies of water often serve as natural boundaries
upon which political divisions are based. Consider, for example, Lake
Tanganyika in East Africa. Lake Tanganyika is a trans-boundary water body
divided among four countries: Tanzania, Burundi, the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, and Zambia.16 It is resource rich. Lake Tanganyika is the third
largest freshwater lake in the world by volume and the second deepest.17 The
lake provides up to forty-percent of the protein in the diets of one million
people living in the lake basin18 and is a critical source of food, income,
water, and transport to approximately ten million people—a population

14. See Ellickson, supra note 6, at 1381 (“All analysts now agree that it is important to distinguish,
as Hardin did not, between open-access territories that anyone may enter and tracts that are accessible
only to the members of a limited populace and their licensees.”).
15. OSTROM, supra note 6, at 30.
16. THOMAS M. LEONARD, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE DEVELOPING WORLD 499 (2013).
17. MYRON ECHENBERG, AFRICA IN THE TIME OF CHOLERA: A HISTORY OF PANDEMICS FROM
1817 TO THE PRESENT 128 (2011).
18. Id.
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roughly twice the size of Norway.19 Lake Tanganyika, however, is now
facing profound resource decimation due to extensive overfishing, oil and
mineral exploration, excessive soil erosion, industrial and urban pollution,
and intensive fishing with unsuitable methods.20 Owing to the supranational
character of the resource, conservation efforts are proving largely
ineffective. As the resource is further depleted, the pace of overexploitation
is accelerating as its users compete for dwindling remains. Lake Tanganyika
is witnessing a tragedy of the commons on a massive, transnational scale—
one that the stakeholders are powerless to prevent.
The tragedy of the commons is captured formally in game theory as a
multi-player prisoner’s dilemma. As the number of stakeholders increases,
the predicament worsens because the threat of free riding looms ever larger.
The dynamic becomes even more unstable in a multi-person prisoner’s
dilemma:21 suspicion of just one defector can cause cooperation to
completely unravel because no party wishes to be the ‘sucker.’ However,
even in the case of just two players, the dilemma emerges.
Figure 1. Below is the tragedy of the commons modeled as a twoperson prisoner’s dilemma involving Tanzania and the Democratic Republic
of Congo (“DRC”), two of the four states that share access to Lake
Tanganyika.

19. ANDREW HUDSON, UNITED NATIONS DEV. FUND, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL FINANCE,
INTERNATIONAL WATERS PROGRAMME 16 (2009).
20. Id.
21. That is, games that involve more than two players—‘N-person prisoner’s dilemmas’ as they
are termed. For a more detailed discussion of such games, see RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION
169 (1982).
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Figure 1 models the dilemma facing Lake Tanganyika as a two-person
prisoner’s dilemma. In the game matrix, the players are Tanzania and the
Democratic Republic of Congo (“DRC”). The states can choose either to
conserve or not to conserve the waters of Lake Tanganyika (cooperate or not
cooperate). If Tanzania and the DRC both choose to conserve, both players
will receive three points—a good outcome (in that it is a sustainable one).
However, if either party chooses to cooperate while the other party does not,
the result will be disastrous for the cooperating party. The non-cooperating
party will receive five points, but the cooperating party will receive zero
points. This creates a powerful temptation for both Tanzania and the DRC to
not cooperate in that they can gain greater advantage by doing so. However,
because this logic holds for both the DRC and Tanzania, and this is known
to both governments, both countries fear that the other party will free ride,
thus rendering noncooperation the dominant strategy. While cooperating (i.e.
conservation) provides mutual benefit regardless of the other player’s
actions, the selfish choice of noncooperation is always the smartest move.22
If the other player does not betray you, you gain the most by betraying them;
if the other player does betray you, then you can mitigate this by also
betraying them. Either way, noncooperation is the dominant strategy,
producing the worst possible outcome for both Tanzania and the DRC—both
states receive only one point (the eventual depletion of the resource). The
sinister element of the prisoner’s dilemma is that the player’s logic is their
own worst enemy because it drives them to the worst possible outcome.
Although conserving the resource is in both countries’ long-term interests,
each country doubts that the other party has sufficiently long time horizons
to stick to its obligations. The tragedy is that the initial good-faith intentions
of Tanzania and the DRC are irrelevant: the countries are driven to deplete
the resource. Even where both parties wish to cooperate, by the diktat of
rationality, they cannot.23 The situation devolves into a race to betray the
other person first—a race to the bottom.24

22. Robert Axelrod & William D. Hamilton, The Evolution of Cooperation, 211 SCI. 1390, 1391
(1981) (“[T]wo individuals can each either cooperate or defect . . . No matter what the other does, the
selfish choice of defection yields a higher payoff than cooperation.”).
23. Much of this explanation of the prisoner’s dilemma draws from an earlier description of the
prisoner’s dilemma I provide elsewhere. See Bryan Druzin, Opening the Machinery of Private Order:
Public International Law as a Form of Private Ordering, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 423, 432–33 (2014).
24. As Axelrod and Hamilton write, “[W]ith two individuals destined never to meet again, the only
strategy that can be called a solution to the game is to defect always despite the seemingly paradoxical
outcome that both do worse than they could have had they cooperated.” Axelrod & Hamilton, supra note
22, at 1391.
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C. Why the Dilemma is Uniquely Pernicious on the Supranational Level
In the quagmire of a prisoner’s dilemma, even angels are forced to
become devils. The situation is such that it compels the parties to cheat for
fear of being the ‘sucker.’25 They cannot trust one another and so, in their
attempt to win, both parties lose. The prisoner’s dilemma is a formidable
obstacle to cooperation in situations lacking third-party enforcement. The
ever-present specter of the other side cheating undermines governance
structures. Without external enforcement mechanisms, it is difficult for the
parties to trust one another and, as a result, cooperative structures typically
collapse. The lack of trust underlying the prisoner’s dilemma is easily
resolved with third-party enforcement. The guarantee of sanctions for noncompliance instills a sufficient degree of confidence in all players that their
fellow-players will ‘play nice.’ Because sanctions for cheating negate any
short-term advantage a player may glean from defection, “trust” is created,
and the prisoner’s dilemma is solved. However, in situations lacking thirdparty enforcement where there are no clear sanctions for non-compliance,
alternative mechanisms are required to solve the prisoner’s dilemma. In such
situations, the dilemma is far more robust and difficult to forestall.
The common-pool resource problem is uniquely pernicious on the
supranational level, because no centralized coercive authority exists to instill
confidence between stakeholders and prevent a downward spiral into
noncooperation. The problem is by no means exclusive to water. The term
global commons refers to any commons lying beyond the political and legal
reach of any one state. These are natural resources upon which the fates of
billions of people—if not of all humanity—depends. Examples include the
global climate system, the ozone shield, Antarctica, the deep seabed minerals
of the world’s oceans, and the atmosphere.26 These resources are nonrenewable on human timescales. Traditionally, these resources remained
untouched by legal jurisdiction because accessing them was not
technologically cost-effective, and the value of the resource was insufficient
to justify acquisition efforts.27 Yet as technology grows more sophisticated
and populations balloon, this economic calculation is changing. As the
environmental impact of our behavior as a species becomes clearer, the need
25. The Prisoner’s Dilemma dynamic is in fact the reason that plea bargaining is forbidden in many
jurisdictions, as it can potentially compel innocent parties to confess to crimes they did not commit. For
a good discussion of this, see generally Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, The Prisoners’ (Plea Bargain)
Dilemma, 1 J. LEGAL ANAL. 737 (2009).
26. See MICHAEL GOLDMAN, PRIVATIZING NATURE: POLITICAL STRUGGLES FOR THE GLOBAL
COMMONS IX–X (1998); ORAN R. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE: PROTECTING THE
ENVIRONMENT IN A STATELESS SOCIETY 20 (1994).
27. See BUCK, supra note 8, at 1 (noting that the technological ability to exploit these resources
“has now caught up with desire”).
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to prevent a tragedy of a commons from emerging on a supranational level
is assuming a degree of alarming urgency. Management of the global
commons requires international and supranational legal regimes capable of
sustaining compliance in the face of mutual distrust.
III. REGULATION, PRIVATIZATION, AND THE PROPOSED
SOLUTION
The tragedy of the commons can be conceptualized as a form of market
failure. Where there are externalities—specifically, where “some of the costs
(or benefits) of an activity are not borne by the decision maker engaging in
that activity—the market will fail to produce an optimal result.”28 The market
will produce either overproduction (where the cost is not completely borne
by the actor) or underproduction (where the benefit is not completely borne
by the actor).29 In a common resource problem, external costs are not borne
entirely by the decision maker. As such, overproduction ensues, typically
leading to resource depletion. The received wisdom of welfare economics
offers two potential solutions to the tragedy of the commons: top-down
regulation or privatization.30 A third approach, what we may call voluntary
small group cooperation, has been explored by the political economist Elinor
Ostrom (for which she won a Nobel prize).31 As Ostrom demonstrated, rules
and institutions can emerge within close-knit communities to ensure shared
management of resources.32 Ostrom’s approach, however, is simply not
viable on the international level. By definition, it does not pertain to global
actors. The international community is the antithesis of a close-knit
community able to develop strong norms of conservation.33 The present
discussion, therefore, focuses exclusively on the first two approaches—topdown regulation and privatization. However, these two approaches do not
fare any better when transposed onto the transnational level of decentralized
governance. As we will see, both the regulatory and privatization approaches
face significant challenges with respect to global commons.

28. Sinden, supra note 4, at 545; see also TOM TIETENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL
RESOURCE ECONOMICS 51–54 (1992).
29. Sinden, supra note 4, at 545.
30. See id. at 535. However, it should be noted that where conditions allow for it, “common
ownership regimes . . . offer a third way out of the tragedy that resists categorization as either a
government regulation or a private property/market regime.” Id. at 548.
31. See OSTROM, supra note 6 (arguing that common-pool problems may be solved by voluntary
organizations rather than by a coercive state or privatization).
32. Id.
33. Although, given a sufficiently high degree of repeated interaction, it is not inconceivable that
the international community may demonstrate some of the traits of a small community.
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A. The Regulatory Approach
Most mainstream neo-classical and Keynesian economists believe
regulatory intervention is needed to correct market inefficiencies.34 As
applied to the commons, we may call this tack the regulatory approach. The
regulatory approach takes a variety of forms. However, attempts to regulate
our way out of the tragedy of the commons generally fall into two broad
camps. The first is command and control regulation, where an administrative
authority directs the behavior of private parties—for instance, legislation
requiring private vehicles to pass an emissions test or requiring homeowners
to install energy-saving light bulbs.35 The second method is arguably less
intrusive and relies on the creation of economic incentives. Examples of this
approach include pollution taxes and environmental trading markets
(“ETMs”).36 One popular example of an ETM is the introduction of tradable
carbon emission permits to control pollution patterns (commonly known as
“cap-and-trade”). Cap-and-trade can be understood as a light-touch, marketbased form of regulation. It artificially creates a market, but then steps back
and allows the market to self-order in relation to larger market forces. While
many place ETMs squarely on the privatization side of the ledger, the
approach is more properly conceptualized as a regulatory solution—it is not
privatization in its most pure sense.37
Classic examples of the command and control approach are antipoaching laws and whaling bans. In both cases, the actions of private parties
are directly controlled by the force of law and the threat of sanctions. In
certain instances, light-touch forms of top-down regulation are employed in
lieu of outright bans. The creation of hunting seasons is a good example.
Similar forms of regulatory tack can be seen in the case of logging where
denuding is restricted in designated areas and allowed to resume after a fixed
number of years in order to avoid permanent deforestation. A more familiar
example of the regulatory approach is the regulation of open-water fishing
to prevent depletion of fishing stock. A common regulatory strategy is to

34. See GREGORY N. MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF MACROECONOMICS 11–12 (2009) (discussing
market failure). But see the concept of “government failure.” For a fantastic overview of the concept, see
generally GORDON TULLOCK, ET AL., GOVERNMENT FAILURE: A PRIMER IN PUBLIC CHOICE (2002).
35. An example of such a scheme is the recently defunct “AirCare” vehicle emissions testing
program in the province of British Columbia, Canada.
36. See Sinden, supra note 4, at 549 (arguing that environmental trading markets should be
conceptualized as merely a more minimalist form of regulation in that even with respect to ETMs, an
administrator still decides where to set the cap on overall resource use).
37. See id. at 549–55; see also Jody Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, Modular Environmental
Regulation, 54 DUKE L.J. 795, 819–20 (2005);. see generally David M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an
Economic Incentive Program?: Replacing the Command and Control/Economic Incentive Dichotomy, 55
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 289 (1998).
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impose quotas that limit species-specific total catch within a given fishery.
Licensing schemes and regulations that prohibit certain kinds of nets, mesh
sizes, or place limits on fish traps are also commonly employed. In some
cases, the threat of the tragedy of the commons is so pernicious that
exceedingly invasive regulation may be imposed. China provided the
ultimate example of such an approach. The country’s one-child policy,
which constrained reproductive freedom for “the common good,” was an
effort to prevent the emergence of a tragedy of commons on a truly massive
scale by directly limiting potential users of the commons.38 Indeed,
population control was precisely the solution that Hardin proposed to solve
the tragedy of the commons.39
While the regulatory approach may solve the dilemma, it is difficult to
implement on the supranational level. The problem is that the global
community is a polycentric mosaic of legal authorities lacking a centralized
authority with coercive strength. International administrative law is nascent
at best and the legal complexity of regulating waterways, lakes, and oceans
that span multiple jurisdictions is enormous.40 With respect to global
commons, the only recourse is international agreements in the form of
environmental treaties and protocols. The international community only
began to recognize in earnest the magnitude of transnational environmental
challenges during the 1960s,41 with international environmental agreements
proliferating significantly following the 1972 Stockholm Intergovernmental
Conference (The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment).42
Such understandings are, in the words of Hardin, “mutual coercion, mutually
agreed upon.”43 However, the ability of such agreements to successfully
address the tragedy of the commons on a supranational level remains
troublingly deficient, as was so patently illustrated by the failure of the Kyoto
Protocol.44 Moreover, international environmental agreements remain
38. China began to formally phase out its one-child policy beginning in 2015. See Chris Buckley,
China Ends One-Child Policy, Allowing Families Two Children, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2015),
http://nyti.ms/1kVjncp [https://perma.cc/G8AJ-JZVF];. see generally ESTHER GOH, CHINA’S ONE-CHILD
POLICY AND MULTIPLE CAREGIVING: RAISING LITTLE SUNS IN XIAMEN (2011) (examining the
sociological impact of China’s one child policy).
39. See Hardin, supra note 5.
40. See William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps,
89 IOWA L. REV. 1, 25 (2003–2004).
41. PETER M. HAAS ET AL., INSTITUTIONS FOR THE EARTH: SOURCES OF EFFECTIVE
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 6 (1993).
42. Michael Zürn, The Rise of International Environmental Politics: A Review of Current Research,
50 WORLD POL. 617, 623 (1998).
43. Buzbee, supra note 40, at 19.
44. For a good examination of why the Kyoto Protocol failed, see generally GERALD KUTNEY,
CARBON POLITICS AND THE FAILURE OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL (2014) (detailing the political evolution
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insufficient in number to adequately address the ecological challenges we
face. With respect to water management, there are 263 transboundary water
basins globally; however, only 158 of these possess any cooperative
management framework.45 There is no coherent legal regime in place to
manage water resources.46 The international governance that does exist is
based upon a disjointed patchwork of environmental treaties that are highly
susceptible to collapse.47 Again, it should be borne in mind that this problem
applies to environmental governance more broadly and is not restricted
merely to conservation of global water commons.
B. The Privatization Approach
While many theorists advocate the regulatory approach in response to
the tragedy of the commons, others fiercely debate the necessity (and
effectiveness) of this approach, pointing to the dangers implicit in regulation.
These voices argue that privatization is a more efficient, effective, and
elegant solution to the problem.48 We may term this approach the
privatization approach. Since the close of the last century and the defeat of
communism at the hands of free market capitalism, the privatization
approach has gained increasing intellectual ascendency—particularly in the
United States—where the market has “all but swept away command and
control as a device for managing resources.”49 There has been a rise in “freemarket environmentalism,” which holds that the enforcement of private
of Kyoto Protocol negotiations and examining its subsequent failure).
45. UNESCO, THE UNITED NATIONS WORLD WATER DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2015: WATER FOR
A SUSTAINABLE WORLD 11 (2015).
46. MATTHEW ZENTNER, DESIGN AND IMPACT OF WATER TREATIES: MANAGING CLIMATE
CHANGE 2 (2012) (“The closest to a universal mechanism is the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention. . .
.”). The UN Watercourses Convention (UNWC) articulates a global legal framework that “establishes
basic standards and rules for cooperation between watercourse states on the use, management, and
protection of international watercourses.” FLAVIA LOURES, ET AL., EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO KNOW
ABOUT THE U.N. WATERCOURSES CONVENTION 1 (2014). However, the UNWC only entered into force
in August 2014 and is limited in scope. It does not provide a meaningful basis for comprehensive water
management. Indeed, the UNWC has been criticized as largely failing to advance sustainable water use
or regulate the discretionary powers of riparian states. See PHILIPPE CULLET, ET AL., WATER LAW FOR
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF WATER LAW REFORM IN
INDIA 38–40 (2009).
47. These mostly come in the form of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), such as the
Kyoto Protocol.
48. With reference to the tragedy of the commons, see generally, e.g.,, Robert Smith, Resolving the
Tragedy of the Commons by Creating Private Property Rights in Wildlife, 1 CATO J. 439 (1981).
Important here is the famed Coase theorem and the idea of private ordering through market forces (where
transaction costs are zero); see generally R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1
(1960); R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
49. Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission
Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 130 (1998–99).

DRUZIN - FOR PUBLICATION(DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

THE PARCHED EARTH OF COOPERATION

11/28/2016 9:06 AM

87

property rights within the free market is sufficient to solve the common
resource problem.50 Common examples of privatization are water markets,51
transferable fishing quotas, and carbon emission trading schemes.52
Although the privatization approach may take a variety of forms, the basic
premise is as follows: converting non-property into private property forces
resource owners to internalize the costs of overexploitation thereby creating
an incentive to preserve the resource.53 The heart of the problem is that
without some kind of property rights regime, a valuable open-access
resource will invariably be overexploited. If a resource is privatized, the
argument goes, the resource owner’s “private cost-benefit analysis would
yield a result that was optimal for society as well as for her. All externalities
would be internalized and the tragedy of the commons would be solved.”54
Privatization solves the problem without the need for top-down regulation
because decision makers bear the full costs and benefits of their actions. The
privatization approach is the second solution Hardin discusses, suggesting
that the commons may be sold off as private property.55
The privatization approach, however, has not proven workable on the
supranational level. Three central problems emerge (from among many). The
first is normative. The second relates to actors’ time horizons with respect to
the resource, and the third concerns the profound logistical challenges of
privatizing commons on a supranational level. Let us examine each of these
in turn.
1. Normative Issues
First, on a basic visceral level, the privatization of water resources is a
radical concept fraught with normative challenges. All living things depend
upon water for their very existence. The proposition that something so
essential to human survival, such as access to water, should be parceled up
and privatized, perhaps allowing for monopoly control of the resource, may
give many profound caution. Indeed, “[u]nlike almost every other form of
property, which we allow to be entirely privatized, water has always been
viewed as something in which the community has a stake and which no one
50. See, e.g., TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM 27–
35 (2001).
51. This is also known as ‘water trading’—the buying and selling of water access entitlements. The
concept is similar in function to ETMs.
52. Sinden, supra note 4, at 537–38. The extent that this can be conceptualized as privatization is,
however, debatable.
53. Daniel H. Cole, Clearing the Air: Four Propositions about Property Rights and Environmental
Protection, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 103, 106 (1999–2000).
54. Sinden, supra note 4, at 556.
55. Hardin, supra note 5, at 1245.
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can fully own.”56 For example, the poor may be priced out of the resource
and underprivileged communities may be bypassed altogether in terms of
access to the resource.57 Because water quality is not readily detectable by
end-users, a privatized market will create incentives to provide the minimum
quality of water in order to maximize profits. Additionally, private water
sectors may engage in political bargaining to block environmental
conservation efforts, giving rise to the danger of regulatory capture on the
domestic level. Yet there are other even more serious concerns. Should a
privatized water market become non-competitive with a few key players or
a single player dominating the global market, the ability to manipulate the
price of such a precious resource could produce catastrophic consequences
of a truly dystopian quality. The power of a global ‘water cartel’ would dwarf
that of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and
its influence over world oil prices. The implications of such a concentration
of power are a very serious cause for concern. Yet, normative reservations
aside, there are other, more technical problems to the privatization approach.
2. No Guarantee of Long Time Horizons
A core problem with privatization is that it may not necessarily yield an
equilibrium that promotes conservation. The core assumption of the
privatization approach is that the market will provide incentives to adopt a
long-term view—a view that government administrators, whose time
horizons often stretch no further than their next career move, may lack.58 A
private owner will have the low discount rate and long time horizon
necessary to conserve a resource. There are, however, several problems with
this assumption—indeed it is not nearly as airtight as many free market
environmentalists would have us believe. If private owner’s time horizons
collapse, so too will the resource. There is empirical work that challenges
this supposition. For instance, a study of the economics of whaling shows
that the “extermination of the entire [whale] population may appear as the
most attractive policy, even to an individual resource owner,” where “(a) the
discount (or time preference) rate sufficiently exceeds the maximum
reproductive potential of the population, and (b) an immediate profit can be

56. Joseph L. Sax, Understanding Transfers: Community Rights and the Privatization of Water, 1
W.N.W. 13, 13 (1994).
57. See SHARON BEDER, ENVIRONMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY
INTRODUCTION 143–45 (2006) (discussing how free-market environmentalism can reinforce existing
inequalities).
58. Cole, supra note 53, at 122. See, e.g., Richard L. Stroup & Sandra L. Goodman, Property
Rights, Environmental Resources, and the Future, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 427, 431–32 (1992)
(arguing that the “ability to capitalize future value into an asset’s present value induces property owners
to consider the long-term implications of their asset-use decisions”).

DRUZIN - FOR PUBLICATION(DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

THE PARCHED EARTH OF COOPERATION

11/28/2016 9:06 AM

89

made from harvesting the last remaining animals . . . .”59 As another example,
the pressure of market competition combined with ignorance of dryland
farming methods drove private farmers in the 1930s to engage in deep
plowing of the virgin topsoil of the United States’ Great Plains, eventually
causing the environmental catastrophe of the Dust Bowl.60
Indeed, many commentators have pointed out that “claims that
‘privatization’ is a necessary and sufficient condition for optimal
environmental protection are inherently implausible, under-supported by
economic theory, and under-determined by the available empirical
evidence.”61 There is no guarantee that private resource owners will always
possess sufficiently high time horizons. For instance, uncertainty regarding
the future value of a resource may drive private owners to overexploit the
resource while prices are high. What would be the fate of the world’s
petroleum reserves if a new energy source capable of wholly replacing the
world’s dependency on oil suddenly became imminent? What would happen
to the pace of logging if a technological substitute for all uses of timber
suddenly appeared on the near horizon? Moreover, the problem of high
discount rates may be particularly pernicious if the resource owner is a public
company with a fiduciary duty to maximize annual profits for short-term
investors who may not “be in it for the long haul.”
3. Logistical Challenges
Perhaps the most fundamental problem with the privatization approach
on the supranational level, however, is that it is often logistically impossible
to divide up and privatize a commons. This is particularly true in the case of
water. Supranational water reserves cannot be privatized. Water flows freely
across multiple jurisdictions, making it impossible to parcel it off under
private ownership. Indeed, water “is a resource that is hard to pin down
within fixed property boundaries and is, thus, particularly vulnerable to the
tragedy of the commons.”62 The physical dimensions of Lake Tanganyika,
for instance, cannot be effectively privatized by creating property
boundaries. This difficulty is even more salient with respect to the world’s
international waterways, seas, and oceans that do not fall under any
59. Colin W. Clark, Profit Maximization and the Extinction of Animal Species, 81 J. POL. ECON.
950, 950–51 (1973); see also Colin W. Clark, The Economics of Overexploitation, 181 SCI. 630, 630
(1973); Edella Schlager & Elinor Ostrom, Property-Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A
Conceptual Analysis, 68 LAND ECON. 249, 256 (1992).
60. DANIEL W. BROMLEY, ENVIRONMENT AND ECONOMY: PROPERTY RIGHTS AND PUBLIC
POLICY 171 (1991). See generally DONALD WORSTER, DUST BOWL: THE SOUTHERN PLAINS IN THE
1930S (2004).
61. Cole, supra note 53, at 105.
62. Sinden, supra note 4, at 576.
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jurisdiction. The problem is that water “flows across boundaries, seeps under
the earth, evaporates into the air, and fluctuates drastically in quantity
depending on random and unpredictable weather patterns. As such, water is
not amenable to the imposition of full ownership rights in the nature of a fee
simple interest in land.”63 While some free market environmentalists have
actually proposed that we privatize the ocean, or at least portions of it,
arguing that the ocean floor may be allocated to private property owners,64
there remain insurmountable logistical hurdles to such an approach.65
Unlike land, the resources of value found in water—like the water
itself—are not tethered to the ocean floor, but rather are suspended in the
water and flow freely around.66 Indeed, Hardin pointed out that privatization
may often be impossible to implement given that certain commons, such as
the earth’s air and water, are logistically impossible to privatize: “the air and
waters surrounding us cannot readily be fenced, and so the tragedy of the
commons as a cesspool must be prevented by different means. . . .”67
Hardin’s solution lies in administrative law.68 The non-fixed nature of water
resources renders effective privatization of large-scale water reserves (or
even small-scale) impracticable. Large bodies of water typically consist of a
myriad of sweeping complex and overlapping ecosystems.69
Related to this is the problem of what we may call “leaky externalities.”
The precise meaning of externalities is difficult to pinpoint—it is difficult
even to delineate what precisely a “commons” is in that the environment is
so interconnected. As such, it is unclear what exactly should be privatized.
The idea that we can parcel off discrete sections of the environment exposes
a profound ignorance of how interconnected the natural environment
actually is. The privatization approach becomes ever more difficult to accept
on a conceptual level as “we become increasingly aware of the vast web of
connections that link species and ecosystems to each other . . . and the extent
to which human activities that disrupt ecosystems can have ripple effects that
extend over vast areas. . . .”70 The problem of “leaky externalities” also

63. Id. at 578.
64. See, e.g., Walter Block, Environmental Problems, Private Property Rights Solutions, in
ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: A RECONCILIATION 281, 292–93 (Walter Block ed., 1990);
ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 50, at 116.
65. Although, some argue that technology may eventually render such an approach feasible. See,
e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Legal Obstacles to Private Ordering in Marine Fisheries, 8 ROGER WILLIAMS
U. L. REV. 9, 21 (2002).
66. Sinden, supra note 4, at 601.
67. Hardin, supra note 5, at 1245.
68. Id.
69. Sinden, supra note 4, at 601.
70. Id. at 588.
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applies to the regulatory approach, but it is particularly relevant to
privatization because of the need to clearly divide the commons between an
array of private actors.
While the privatization approach may be an effective tool to promote
conservation and prevent the tragedy of the commons in some situations, this
is not always the case. It is particularly difficult to implement on the
supranational level. On the supranational level, the privatization approach
fares no better than the regulatory approach (and it arguably fares worse).
The key problem remains: how can the tragedy of the commons be diffused
in situations of decentralized governance where actors do not answer to an
overarching authority? Privatization does not change this equation in any
way. While regulating or privatizing our way out of the dilemma represents
divergent solutions to the problem, the two approaches are the same in the
sense that they both rely ultimately on enforcement. In the case of the
regulatory approach, this is obvious: regulation requires the enforcement of
sanctions for plundering the commons. With respect to privatization, the
need for enforcement may be less obvious, but no less true. Privatization
requires an overarching legal authority to enforce private property rights.
With either approach, we eventually return to the same problem—in a
transnational, decentralized governance situation, there is no authority
capable of enforcing the rules of the game. Thus, the challenge before us is
to devise a solution that can produce stable coordination in the absence of
such an authority.
C. The Proposed Solution: The Commons Management Fund
In light of these deficiencies, this discussion proposes a solution. The
idea—the Commons Management Fund deposit scheme (“CMF”)—would
work as follows: states joining (or already party to) an agreement would
contribute an upfront “deposit” to an international regulatory body with the
understanding that all or part of their contribution will be forfeited if they
fail to honor their treaty commitments. The goal of the scheme, however, is
not to remedy particular instances of non-compliance; rather—and this is an
important point—it is to produce a sufficient degree of initial confidence in
other parties’ level of commitment so as to prevent a tragedy of the commons
from emerging. The working assumption here is that states want to comply—
this is the reason why states enter into environmental agreements in the first
place. The problem is simply one of trust. The CMF is designed to build
trust.
The CMF would be an international regulatory body that could be
established under the auspices of the United Nations (the “UNCMF”). The
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CMF would comprise the deposit scheme but would also consist of the
institutional structures required to implement and oversee the system. Any
group of states could register a treaty (e.g., the Paris Agreement) with the
CMF, and their combined deposits would be held in reserve.71 This deposit
would have to be large—very large. The deposit with accrued interest would
be returned to member states after a specified period of time (i.e., the
conclusion of the treaty. For minor infractions, a deduction could be made
from a state’s deposit. For major breaches, the entire deposit may be forfeited
(under one variant of the model, a state’s deposit would be distributed to one
or more other parties in order to incentivize monitoring).72 The CMF would
include a regulatory body that would be charged with investigating alleged
breaches. To accommodate potential wealth disparities between states, a
percentage-based variant of the deposit scheme based on Gross Domestic
Product (“GDP”), or other relevant metrics, could be designed. A
percentage-based deposit would maintain its efficacy in that it would signal
the same degree of commitment (building trust). Such a scheme would have
the benefit of remaining financially accessible to all states regardless of the
size of their economies. The extent of the deposit necessary to signal states’
commitment and build sufficient trust could be left to the determination of
the parties themselves—the parties are best positioned to understand how
strong of a commitment is required. We can be confident that they will do so
because in a tragedy of the commons, the stakeholders are typically acting
in good faith—the problem is merely that the fear of defection by other
parties drives all parties to defect.
The CMF is a governance mechanism available to governments to
strengthen their ability to coordinate through signaling commitment (a
detailed exposition of the theory that underlies this is discussed in the
following section). Some readers may feel the proposal is unrealistic because
governments would be reluctant to provide such large deposits. What should
be appreciated, however, is that any level of deposit will boost the signaling
ability of the parties—anything is better than nothing, and the higher the
deposit, the stronger the signal. Moreover, the CMF would provide an
invaluable separating equilibrium. A state’s hesitation to contribute the funds
necessary to administer the CMF would clearly signal to other governments
that state’s lack of genuine commitment to the agreement.

71. The CMF need not be limited to merely environmental agreements. However, the focus here is
upon the tragedy of the commons, a problem that manifests quite starkly with respect to the conservation
of common-pool resources.
72. The idea of using the forfeited sums to incentivize whistleblowing was suggested to me by Prof.
Bryan Mercurio.
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While the CMF model can be understood as falling on the regulatory
side of the ledger, it is not top-down regulation—it is bottom-up regulation,
self-imposed by parties trapped in a tragedy of the commons. This distinction
is crucial because this bottom-up character allows the CMF to function on a
supranational level. Indeed, because the current global order operates in a
technical state of anarchy, there is no other choice but for enforcement to
unfold in a bottom-up fashion. The model is deceptively complex. It may not
be immediately apparent, however, given the peculiar dynamics of
multilateral environmental agreements, as will be shown, the CMF is
uniquely crafted to diffuse a tragedy of the commons. To appreciate why this
is the case, a structural understanding of how multilateral environmental
agreements typically unravel and the limitations of conventional
enforcement mechanisms is required.
IV. HOW THE CMF DIFFERS FROM TRADITIONAL COMPLIANCE
MECHANISMS
The tragedy of the commons is a unique dynamic that calls for a unique
solution. The CMF concept is simple; however, its theoretical underpinnings
are complex. Let us unpack this, paying special attention to the unique
character of multilateral environmental agreements, and, in particular, how
such agreements typically fail.
A. The Inherent ‘Tippiness’ of Multilateral Environmental Agreements
The vast majority of treaties in fact do not possess robust external
enforcement mechanisms.73 Nevertheless, there is a growing interest in
employing compliance mechanisms in multilateral environmental
agreements (“MEAs”) as a means to encourage compliance.74 Compliance

73. Beth Simmons, Treaty Compliance and Violation, 13 ANNU. REV. POLIT. SCI. 273, 277 (2010).
Enforcement mechanisms have been well-studied in theories of treaty compliance. This literature is large;
however, there are prominent theorists. See generally, e.g., MARKUS BURGSTALLER, THEORIES OF
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005) (providing a comprehensive analysis of theories of
compliance); EDITH BROWN WEISS & HAROLD KARAN JACOBSON, ENGAGING COUNTRIES:
STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS (2000) (presenting a
systematic examination of implementation and compliance with international environmental accords);
Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997) (presenting
a compliance theory predicated on vertical interaction between private and public actors); ABRAM
CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL
REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1998) (proposing a managerial approach and arguing that coercion is not
the primary instrument of compliance).
74. Nils Goeteyn & Frank Maes, Compliance Mechanisms in Multilateral Environmental
Agreements: An Effective Way to Improve Compliance?, 10 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 791, 791 (2011).
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mechanisms may be positive75 or negative—carrot or stick in nature.76 With
respect to negative enforcement mechanisms, four main types of penalties
can be discerned. These are: warnings; suspension of privileges; trade
sanctions; and liability.77 Each represents an escalation in severity.78 A
warning—the least severe penalty—indicates that stronger penalties are
forthcoming if the actor does not change its behavior.79 Some MEAs provide
for a suspension of privileges whereby certain rights under the agreement are
denied to the non-compliant party—for example, participation in voting or
various committees.80 The threat of trade sanctions may be effective; parties
deemed non-compliant may incur substantial economic (and even political)
costs.81 Non-compliant parties may be required to offer compensation, often
in the form of financial reparations for the damage caused by their
misbehavior.82
While these penalties can exert substantial compliance pressure in
international treaties, negative enforcement mechanisms of this nature do not
always map well onto agreements involving a tragedy of the commons
dynamic. The problem is that, because such agreements rest so much on
expectations, coordination under governance regimes that involve a tragedy
of the commons dynamic can be exceedingly fragile and thus easily
undermined by such penalties. Such agreements are susceptible to collapse,
which may be triggered by even trivial defections. The problem resides in
the unique nature of MEAs—the value of an MEA is largely tied to the
number of actors adhering to the agreement. An agreement to reduce carbon
emissions between only two states, for example, provides little value. Not
only does such an agreement achieve little in terms of actually reducing
global carbon emissions, more crucially for our purposes, the two states will
be highly reluctant to assume the burden of curbing their emissions while the

75. Indeed, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) has provided guidelines that set
out an assortment of techniques to facilitate compliance in MEAs, ranging from financial and technical
assistance to capacity building and technology transfer. See generally UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT
PROGRAMME, MANUAL ON COMPLIANCE WITH AND ENFORCEMENT OF MULTILATERAL
ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS (2006) for a fuller discussion.
76. ULRICH BEYERLIN, PETER-TOBIAS STOLL & RÜDIGER WOLFRUM, ENSURING COMPLIANCE
WITH MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: A DIALOGUE BETWEEN PRACTITIONERS AND
ACADEMIA 306 (2006).
77. UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME (UNEP), COMPLIANCE MECHANISMS UNDER
SELECTED MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS 117 (2007).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer is an example of an
MEA that provides such a penalty.
81. See JACOB WERKSMANN, GREENING INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 102 (2014).
82. UNEP, supra note 77, at 117–18.
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remainder of the international community does nothing. However, the value
of the same agreement increases dramatically with twenty, ninety, or 190
governments in hand. This is why it was so vital that the Paris Agreement
lock down the participation of all the states of the world. A strong argument
could be made that the Kyoto Protocol’s lack of success stemmed from its
failure to secure an equal commitment from all the world’s states; thereby
undermining its chances at success from its very inception.83
An MEA’s value increases as more parties comply with the agreement,
and the inverse is equally true: an MEA’s value decreases commensurate
with the number of actors who either do not comply or exit the agreement
altogether. This is a classic example of what is known in the economics
literature as a network effect.84 The larger the network of adopters, the greater
value the agreement provides and vice versa.85 Perceptions are
extraordinarily consequential under such conditions. Because the value of a
standard or product depends upon how many other actors adopt it, actors’
83. The developed nations of the world accepted the initial reductions called for under the Protocol
with the developing world not included in the reductions. See generally A.W. GALSTON & CHRISTIANA
Z. PEPPARD, EXPANDING HORIZONS IN BIOETHICS (2005). For a good general discussion of the failure of
the Kyoto Protocol, see KUTNEY supra note 44. See also generally DAVID G. VICTOR, THE COLLAPSE OF
THE KYOTO PROTOCOL AND THE STRUGGLE TO SLOW GLOBAL WARMING (2011) (arguing that the
Protocol does not provide for adequate monitoring and enforcement of emissions trading).
84. Network effects (also known as network externalities) emerge where the implicit value of a
product or service increases as the number of other agents using the same product or service grows, which
in turn draws more users. See S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis., Network Externalities, in THE NEW
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 671, 671 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). Network
externalities arise from the need for compatibility between standards. The classic example of a network
effect is language. The more people who, for example, speak English, the more useful English is to each
one of its speakers. This creates a positive externality. As more people speak English, the value of the
language increases for everyone. For the foundational literature on network effects, see M. L. Katz & C.
Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424, 424 (1985);
see also SCOTT BARRETT, ENVIRONMENT AND STATECRAFT: THE STRATEGY OF ENVIRONMENTAL
TREATY-MAKING 261–62 (2003) (discussing network externalities in environmental treaties).
85. I have discussed network effects at length elsewhere. See, e.g., Bryan Druzin, Buying
Commercial Law: Choice of Law, Choice of Forum, and Network Effect, 18 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L.
131 (2009) (arguing that network effects induce standardization in choice of law and choice of forum
clauses in transnational commercial contracts); Bryan Druzin, Anarchy, Order, and Trade: A Structuralist
Account of Why a Global Commercial Legal Order is Emerging, 47 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1049,
1076–83 (2014) (arguing that network effects help standardize legal practices); Bryan Druzin,
Spontaneous Standardization and the New Lex Maritima, in OXFORD INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
SERIES: THE CONTINUED DEVELOPMENT OF SHIPPING LAW 63, 72–73 (Miriam Goldby ed., 2016)
(arguing that network effects manifest powerfully in shipping law as a consequence of the high level of
natural interconnection implicit in shipping networks, and that this helps spontaneously standardize the
legal practices of the lex maritima); Bryan Druzin, Why Does Soft Law Have Any Power Anyway? ASIAN
J. OF INT’L L. (2016) (arguing that network effects help explain why, although lacking legal and coercive
force, so much soft law is widely adopted and followed); Bryan Druzin, Towards a Theory of Spontaneous
Legal Standardization, J. OF INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT (2016) (positing a theory as to how legal
standardization may occur in a decentralized, spontaneous fashion as the result of network externalities
and increasing returns) (forthcoming).
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choices are largely based on the expected size of the network.86 This being
the case, “consumer expectations may drive market outcomes such that they
become self-fulfilling.”87 In markets exhibiting network effects (as with any
game with multiple equilibria), expectations are key. As such, the network
effect character of a MEA renders it uniquely vulnerable to “bandwagons.”
A positive bandwagon of actors joining the treaty is a case of what is known
as increasing returns. A negative bandwagon of actors abandoning the
treaty—a sort of “jumping ship” effect—is a case of what is known as
decreasing returns. The decreasing returns nature of MEAs makes them
extremely ‘tippy’ and highly susceptible to collapse.88 A case could be made
that the United States’ sudden withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol in the
opening months of the Bush administration initiated a negative bandwagon,
tipping the agreement towards eventual failure.89 This dynamic is not as
salient in the case of, for example, a multilateral trade agreement (at least it
is not the primary problem). Even if a large number of signatories exit a trade
agreement, the agreement may still retain a significant degree of value for
the remaining treaty members. Such agreements can thus better withstand
the blow of one or more parties withdrawing from the agreement or cheating.
This difference is significant because it will determine which enforcement
mechanism is most appropriate to attenuate a tragedy of the commons.
Traditional negative compliance mechanisms are designed to punish
offenders. While this may work well when considered in isolation (indeed,
it can be very effective in forcing parties to change their behavior), such
punitive mechanisms do not apply well to treaties with the potential for
decreasing returns (i.e. a tragedy of the commons). Negative compliance
mechanisms can cause the collapse of a treaty, with a few defecting parties
triggering a mass exodus from the agreement as a negative bandwagon takes
hold. Even in the best of scenarios, such measures will significantly weaken
an agreement’s cohesion because confidence in the commitment of other
parties will be undermined. With a tragedy of the commons dynamic,
perception is reality. If actors believe others will comply, they are more
likely to comply; if actors believe others will not comply, they are less likely
to comply.

86. LUÍS M. B. CABRAL, INTRODUCTION TO INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 312 (2000).
87. Irina Suleymanova, et al., On the Role of Consumer Expectations in Markets with Network
Effects 2 (Dice Discussion Paper, Paper No. 13, 2010).
88. For a similar analysis in this vein, see BARRETT, supra note 84, at 254–67.
89. For a discussion of the U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol, see DIANNE RAHM, CLIMATE
CHANGE POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES: THE SCIENCE, THE POLITICS AND THE PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE
77–80 (2010); MICHAEL G. FAURE, GREEN GIANTS?: ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES
AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 358–61 (2004).
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As such, even relatively benign punitive measures against a party, such
as a warning or a temporary suspension of privileges, signals to other parties
that coordination has faltered. The perception that commitment to the
agreement may be flagging may cause other parties to not comply. In this
fashion, even a small spark can incinerate cooperation. As the severity of the
punitive mechanisms increase, the possibility of a negative bandwagon
effect increases. Economic sanctions or forcing a non-complying party to
pay exacting reparations may cause the sanctioned party to simply withdraw
from the agreement. While sanctions are typically considered essential to
achieving compliance in trade agreements,90 withdrawal of even one party
can destabilize a treaty exhibiting a tragedy of the commons dynamic in that
it can trigger a negative bandwagon—causing the treaty to ‘tip’ suddenly
towards collapse. Some treaty regimes even provide for the expulsion of noncomplying parties as a penalty.91 In a tragedy of the commons dynamic,
treaty expulsion is highly self-defeating—expulsion of a few key members
may lead to total treaty collapse. The unique nature of tragedy of the
commons scenarios must be fully appreciated—i.e. the value of the
agreement is contingent upon all the other parties also complying. The
dynamic this produces is markedly different than those at play with respect
to other international agreements.
B. The Power of Signaling
Understanding this, it becomes clear why the CMF is well-suited to
address a tragedy of the commons dynamic. The problem for most treaty
types is that parties may cheat if incentive structures change, so punitive
measures are necessary ex post (after the fact) to discourage cheating.
However, in the case of treaties exhibiting a tragedy of the commons
dynamic, incentive structures may remain unchanged, yet parties otherwise
willing to honor their commitments may cheat simply due to a lack of trust.
In a tragedy of the commons, the mere fear of others cheating induces
cheating. Because the primary problem is one of trust, robust ex ante (before
the fact) signaling can be particularly effective in solving the dilemma. A
sufficiently large monetary deposit achieves this by producing an initial burst
of confidence that stabilizes the agreement and keeps the tragedy of the
commons at bay. Ex ante signaling, if sufficiently robust, can short-circuit a
tragedy of the commons before it forms and is a far safer method of inducing
compliance given the implicit fragility of MEAs. Indeed, the CMF’s deposit
90. ISMAIL SERAGELDIN & JOAN MARTIN-BROWN, PARTNERSHIPS FOR GLOBAL ECOSYSTEM
MANAGEMENT 147 (1997).
91. See AARON SCHWABACH, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES: A REFERENCE
HANDBOOK 29–30 (2006).
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scheme should be understood not as an ex post compliance mechanism, but
rather as an ex ante signaling device.
Signaling models of international agreements are discussed in the
international law literature.92 Such models are conceptually related to
credible commitment theory, the basic idea being that actors credibly signal
their commitment to carry out obligations in the face of future, yet-unrealized
incentives to renege.93 The “essential feature of credible commitment theory
is that states must be willing to pay a nontrivial cost in order to participate in
the agreement. It is the willingness to bear these costs that makes the
agreement more credible than it would otherwise be.”94 The literature
distinguishes between ex post costs paid only in the case of non-compliance,
and ex ante costs paid in advance.95 These function very differently—“[h]igh
ex ante costs send a credible signal of intentions: No rational government
would pay a high ‘down payment’ on a cooperative enterprise if they did not
intend to carry it out. High ex ante costs in effect screen governments by
type, revealing their true intentions.”96
In game theory, a party with private, but nonverifiable information as
to their intentions can signal that information by their choice of behavior.97
This is known in the literature as costly signaling (the conceptual analog to
credible commitment theory in the political science literature).98 The CMF
92. Simmons, supra note 73, at 276. Much of this has focused on the process of treaty ratification
as a signal of commitment. See generally, e.g., LISA L. MARTIN, DEMOCRATIC COMMITMENTS:
LEGISLATURES AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION (2000) (examining the impact of institutionalized
legislative participation on the credibility of state commitments).
93. Simmons, supra note 73, at 276.
94. Id.
95. Id.; see also generally James D. Fearon, Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands
Versus Sinking Costs, 41 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 68 (1997).
96. Simmons, supra note 73, at 276.
97. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 151–58 (1994) (using a case
study involving penalty clauses in contract negotiations to show how parties can signal non-verifiable
information).
98. The earliest work on signaling games was A.M. Spence’s model of education signaling. See
generally Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 90 Q. J. OF ECON. 225 (1973). However, Thorsten
Veblen in his study of conspicuous consumption should be credited with first postulating the idea of
signaling. THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS (1899). The role of signaling has been
extensively studied in economics. See generally In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, Signaling Games and
Stable Equilibria, 102 Q. J OF ECON. 179 (1987). For a good overview of signaling games in relation to
the prisoner’s dilemma, see PRAJIT K. DUTTA, STRATEGIES AND GAMES: THEORY AND PRACTICE
383−402 (1999). The impact of signaling may of course be increased if it is costly—a dynamic known in
both economics and biology as costly signaling, the basis of costly signaling theory (CST). For CST’s
economic embodiment, Spence’s work is the foundational piece. I provide a more extensive overview of
CST elsewhere (in the field of biology as well as economics). See Bryan Druzin, Law, Selfishness, and
Signals: An Expansion of Posner’s Signaling Theory of Social Norms, 24 CANADIAN J. OF L. & JURIS. 5,
26−27 (2011) (arguing that norm internalization is an adaptive quality that enhances the individual’s
ability to signal cooperation); see also generally Bryan Druzin, Eating Peas with One’s Fingers: A
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is designed to facilitate costly signaling and preemptively thwart the
emergence of a tragedy of the commons by building sufficient confidence
among member states that they are equally committed to compliance. Ex post
costs function in an entirely different manner—such penalties do not screen
actors; rather, they constrain their behavior.99 With respect to overcoming a
tragedy of the commons, this is a crucial difference. Ex post penalties are far
weaker signals. While ex post penalties also communicate commitment in
that parties willingly subject themselves to these measures, the signal is less
robust because it is unclear if the party will actually incur the penalty. In
many cases, an actor will simply withdraw from the agreement at a later
stage. In other cases, sanctioning mechanisms are rarely used even when they
are available.100 In actual practice, collective enforcement through penalties
and binding judicial processes such as dispute settlement remain relatively
rare.101 States rarely invoke enforcement mechanisms.102 There are several
reasons for this. The imposition of sanctions is costly for the sanctioning
state or states.103 In many cases, states are simply reluctant to bear the burden
of imposing sanctions on non-compliant parties.104 Indeed, theorists “have
long recognized that, with few exceptions, enforcement—from military
action, to economic sanctions, to diplomatic hardball—is costly.105 Where
they are available, treaty-based sanctions are actually seldom used.106 In fact,
most treaties do not incorporate enforcement mechanisms of any kind.107
As such, it makes more sense to impose costs on the “front end” of a
treaty. This allows parties to signal their commitment at a far more crucial
Semiotic Approach to Law and Social Norms, 26 INT’L J. SEMIOTIC L. 257 (2013) (proposing a signaling
theory of social norms). The role of signaling in repeated games has been comprehensively studied both
empirically and theoretically. See, e.g., MOHAMMED ABDELLAOUI, UNCERTAINTY AND RISK: MENTAL,
FORMAL, EXPERIMENTAL REPRESENTATIONS 280 (2007). For a good summary of the work on signaling
in the economics literature, see DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY 645−54
(1990).
99. Simmons, supra note 73, at 277.
100. ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY REGIMES 32−33 (1995).
101. UNEP, supra note 77, at 7.
102. WALTER CARLSNAES ET AL., HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 367 (2012). There
has in fact been a shift away from coercive mechanisms such as sanctions towards a more “managerial”
approach which instead favours positive mechanisms such as transparency and capacity-building. See
GEIR ULFSTEIN, MAKING TREATIES WORK: HUMAN RIGHTS, ENVIRONMENT AND ARMS CONTROL 373
(2007).
103. ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA H. CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 33 (2009).
104. See CARLSNAES, supra note 102, at 367.
105. Id.
106. REGINA S. AXELROD & STACY D. VANDEVEER, THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT: INSTITUTIONS,
LAW, AND POLICY 124−25 (2014).
107. See BARRETT, supra note 84, at 254.
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stage, nudging perceptions in the right direction and thereby stymieing the
emergence of a tragedy of the commons. Communicating commitment
through ex ante signaling better suits a tragedy of the commons dynamic
because it is preventative rather than punitive. A tragedy of the commons
dynamic is unique because it turns on expectations regarding the strength of
other parties’ commitment. An initial burst of confidence, if sufficiently
powerful, can stabilize the agreement and prevent a tragedy of the commons
from emerging. The core problem with agreements that do not involve a
tragedy of the commons dynamic is that cooperation may be difficult to
sustain if incentive structures change, but this is not the primary problem
with agreements grappling with a tragedy of the commons (although this
may also occur). Rather, the core problem is that parties otherwise willing to
cooperate are forced to cheat because they cannot risk trusting other players,
which initiates a downward spiral into non-cooperation.
Traditional compliance mechanisms are designed to prevent defection
in the face of shifting incentive structures. Even if parties initially intend to
comply, they may later renege due to a change in incentives. This is not the
case with the tragedy of the commons (at least it is not the primary problem).
A tragedy of the commons is unique in that all parties may continually wish
to comply throughout the collapse of a treaty; however, the agreement may
nevertheless collapse. This is an important difference. The dynamic in a
tragedy of the commons is fundamentally different than in other cooperation
scenarios and therefore calls for a fundamentally different solution—i.e. a
greater use of ex ante signaling. The CMF is such a solution—it is a system
for clear ex ante signaling designed to defuse the tragedy of the commons
before it emerges. The CMF is essentially a massive signaling device—it is
a tool to amplify commitment signaling during the early stages of an
agreement when trust is at a premium.
C. Key Features of the Commons Management Fund
Several features of the CMF distinguish it from traditional compliance
mechanisms. This final section of the discussion notes some of these
features.
1. Commercial Signaling to Treaty Signaling
The CMF in fact mirrors strategies employed by commercial actors
operating under similar conditions of distrust. The CMF simply imports this
same process to the supranational level of treaty compliance between states.
In commercial relationships lacking third party enforcement (or where such
enforcement is unreliable or costly), private parties credibly signal their
commitment through various means. This signaling often takes the form of
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non-refundable deposits, deeds of guarantee, or large sums of money being
held in escrow. For example, while the purpose of the damage deposit
provided by a tenant renting property is to compensate the landlord for any
ex post damage that may occur, the deposit in fact serves a second, less
obvious function. It is a powerful signaling device—it credibly signals the
tenant’s intention to exercise care and maintain the property. A financiallyable tenant unwilling to pay a damage deposit would signal something about
her commitment to properly care for the property. Commercial relationships
are chalk full of commitment signaling, often in very subtle ways. For
instance, two companies with plans to collaborate will often signal their
commitment by early investments in sunk costs, such as costly machinery,
office space rentals, etc. This ex ante commitment signaling instills
immediate confidence in the authenticity of the other party’s commitment to
the agreement. Such behavior allows parties to correctly decipher in advance
the time horizons of other actors.
What is true with respect to agreements between private commercial
parties is also true for international states parties to treaties. Indeed, treaties
often provide repeated opportunities to signal commitment through
staggered stages of performance in order to sustain cooperation.108 Consider
the terms of the New START treaty, which call for a number of specific
actions within designated periods covering a period extending from the first
few days after entering into force up to the entire ten-year life of the treaty.109
This structure provides for rounds of commitment signaling (concentrated in
the early stages of the treaty where there is a poverty of trust) before parties
progress to subsequent stages of the treaty. For instance, the New START
treaty calls for an exchange of inspector information within the first twentyfive days after entry into force;110 the provision of information on the
numbers, locations, and technical characteristics of weapon systems no later
than forty-five days;111 an exhibition of strategic offensive arms no later than
sixty days;112 the one-time exhibition of U.S. heavy bombers no later than
108. I discuss this idea elsewhere where I term the concept performance signaling theory. Pertinent
to the present discussion is the concept of signal-induced trust I have articulated in an earlier article. See
generally Bryan Druzin, Opening the Machinery of Private Order: Public International Law as a Form
of Private Ordering, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 423 (2014).
109. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the
Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, U.S.-Russ., Apr. 8, 2010, S. TREATY
DOC. NO. 111-5 (2010). The following account of New START is largely drawn from a previous
description I have provided elsewhere. See Druzin, supra note 23, at 460−61.
110. Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on
Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, U.S.-Russ., pt. 4, §
VI(5), Apr. 8, 2010, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 111-5 (2010).
111. Id. at pt. 2, § I (3).
112. Id. at pt. 5, §§ I (2), VIII(2).
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120 days;113 and so on. This signaling structure encourages compliance even
in the absence of third-party enforcement. The CMF builds on the same
premise. However, unlike treaties which rely on static rounds of signaling
embedded into a treaty regime, the CMF model possesses several unique
features that should be noted.
2. Signaling Strength is Adjustable
A particularly useful aspect of the CMF is that the signal strength is
adjustable to whatever level of intensity the stakeholders wish to make it—
the larger the sum, the more costly the signal and thus the more credible each
agent’s commitment to the agreement. To use a colloquialism: the CMF
allows parties to an agreement “to put one’s money where one’s mouth is.”
The fact that the deposit is adjustable provides a tremendous degree of
flexibility. The strength of the signal can be varied in relation to the precise
circumstances of the agreement. It may be that in some cases a large deposit
may not be required. Assuming a sufficient degree of monitoring, credible
commitment may be signaled by setting the deposit amount just high enough
to negate any potential benefit gained through noncompliance. The signal
strength need only be powerful enough to convince parties that there is
sufficient incentive for the majority of member states to comply. The
stakeholders can calibrate the deposit sum accordingly.
The deposit need not be an unbreakable firewall against all defection—
it need only significantly reduce the likelihood of defection and thereby
maintain the impression that the agreement is robust. If the agreement is
perceived as robust, it will be robust. In many circumstances, a minimal
deposit may be sufficient to successfully inculcate this belief and prevent
stakeholders from sliding into a tragedy of the commons out of mistrust.
Treaty members may anticipate that some parties might still exit the treaty;
however, so long as parties believe that the majority of the treaty members
will keep their commitments, a negative bandwagon will not form.
In some cases a stronger signal may be needed. For instance, in periods
of potential treaty instability brought about by unanticipated exogenous
shocks (e.g., political shifts, sudden changes in market price or supply, etc.),
the deposit sum may be increased to boost the signal strength in order to restabilize the treaty. A fresh round of signaling can short-circuit a negative
bandwagon before it takes hold. The signal strength may also be adjusted
downward. For instance, after a long period of treaty stability that has
successfully fostered robust norms of cooperation, heavy signaling may no
longer be required and so the deposit burden may be lightened accordingly.

113. Id. at pt. 9, Fourth Agreed Statement, 3.
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Other cases may call for entirely different approaches. For instance, if
governments are initially reluctant to make such a significant commitment,
the deposit sum may be incrementally increased over a period of time,
ratcheting up the signal in a graduated fashion. This will render the treaty
less robust in the beginning phase but may be the only option when faced
with a group of reluctant parties.
Whatever the case, the framework provides a high degree of flexibility:
the simplicity of the CMF allows member states to adjust an agreement’s
signal strength to the precise level needed. This is a powerful feature of the
model.
3. Can Be Grafted onto Existing Agreements
The CMF can be used to bolster existing treaties. The CMF is
essentially a “heavy” signaling mechanism that may be grafted onto existing
or future multilateral environmental agreements to strengthen compliance.
Such an approach would not conflict with existing normative frameworks
for multilateral environmental agreements. Indeed, guideline 14(d) of the
UNEP Manual on Compliance with and Enforcement of Multilateral
Environmental Agreements114 suggests the introduction of various
techniques to enhance compliance.115 Tethering a multilateral environmental
agreement to a corollary agreement under the CMF could be considered such
a technique to compel compliance. In principle, the CMF can be generalized
to augment and strengthen compliance for any type of treaty—it need not be
restricted to multilateral environmental agreements. The CMF may be used
to reinforce and strengthen compliance for any agreement between
international actors. However, for reasons already discussed, it is particularly
effective in strengthening MEAs because it is ideally suited to address
tragedy of the commons scenarios where all parties desire coordination, but
are nonetheless driven to uncooperative outcomes.
4. The Model is Scalable
The framework could be open to actors on all scales of governance—
from the regional to the global level. The CMF allows for extraordinary
flexibility in this respect. The CMF can reinforce treaty-based governance
on any scale, facilitating the creation of tailor-made regional based MEAs
114. Guideline 14(d) states that countries “can consider the inclusion of non-compliance provisions
in a multilateral environmental agreement, with a view to assisting parties having compliance problems
and addressing individual cases of non-compliance, taking into account the importance of tailoring
compliance provisions and mechanisms to the agreement’s specific obligations.” UNEP, supra note 77,
at 116.
115. These may be warnings, trade sanctions, withdrawal or suspension of privileges, and other
punitive measures. See id. at 103–22.
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rather than fixed environmental protocols at the global level. Such an
approach is advantageous in that parties on regional levels are arguably
better equipped to set realistic conservation targets and gauge the size of
deposits necessary to thwart a tragedy of the commons. Regional agreements
can be tailored to offset specific factors that threaten to undermine
coordination at the regional level. Global environmental protocols that
require a broad base of commitment across many governments with targets
that may be unrealistic for certain parties are more susceptible to collapse
because they are more vulnerable to a negative bandwagon. As such, a readymade governance mechanism like the CMF, available to parties on any scale
of interaction, could engender more robust international environmental
governance. In principle, there is no reason why even private actors could
not register their agreements with the CMF. The CMF is a governance
structure that remains accessible to all—from private parties to state actors.
The CMF can function on the most regional level or it can be scaled up to
include in its sweep the entire international community.
5. Coordination is Easy to Achieve
As we have seen, the disadvantage of common-pool resources is that
they are highly susceptible to the tragedy of the commons. Their advantage,
however, is that, because all actors desire cooperation, it does not take much
to trigger it. The stakeholders desire cooperation so long as others also
cooperate. Thus, if the correct measures are put in place, a stable
coordination equilibrium is not difficult to achieve. This provides the CMF
a significant advantage over other treaty types. The tragedy of the commons
is a truly unique dynamic in that parties desire compliance, but are
structurally driven toward non-compliance. It will often be the case,
therefore, that only gentle shifts in perception are necessary to generate
stability and thwart the emergence of a tragedy of the commons. The critical
issue is the collective expectation that a sufficient number of actors will
comply. While agreements exhibiting a tragedy of the commons dynamic are
susceptible to collapse, the upside is that because such agreements revolve
around collective expectations, coordination can be easily attained if the
correct measures are implemented at early stages. In non-tragedy-of-thecommons type treaties, defection incentives may fluctuate wildly. Heavyhanded enforcement mechanisms are thus required. This is not the case with
agreements imperiled by a tragedy of the commons. The remedy may be
extremely light-touch. While common-pool resources are pre-disposed to the
tragedy of the commons, its emergence can be easily averted with sufficient
signaling. Again, the stakeholders desire compliance—we need only provide
an environment in which it is rational for them to do so.
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V. CONCLUSION
The question at the heart of the ecological crisis before us is essentially
this: how can the international community successfully coordinate without a
dominant coercive authority to keep states in line? The “dominant view in
international relations—shared by a broad range of scholars working in the
rationalist tradition—recognizes that agreements that cannot be enforced by
a third party must in some sense be self-enforcing.”116 But how are we to
achieve this? Short of a global empire, top-down regulation is not an
option—the community of nations must somehow regulate itself. Given
everything we know about the difficulty of sustaining cooperation in
decentralized governance situations and the current political fragmentation
of the world, this is not an easy task. Yet we do not have the luxury of waiting
for the slow advance of global governance—we must accelerate this process
through every means at our disposal. Governments need to stick to the
international commitments they make, but for this there needs to be
executive authority in some form. Without effective governance structures,
treaties will reliably fail as parties spiral into the self-defeating morass of
mutual distrust.
The Commons Management Fund is such a governance structure.
Technically understood, the CMF is a regulatory solution. It is, however,
bottom-up rather than top-down. This distinction is important because the
decentralized juridical nature of the current world order requires a bottomup approach to achieve cooperation—there is no alternative. Ultimately, the
CMF’s viability is difficult to predict. The only true test of the approach will
come with actual implementation, after which the plan’s efficacy would
simply be an empirical question. What is not difficult to predict, however, is
this: given the seriousness of the global ecological crisis before us, if
meaningful action on a massive transnational scale is not undertaken now,
our ability to collectively course-correct will soon reach a threshold where it
will become impossible to do so.

116. Simmons, supra note 75, at 275.

